Complacency and Accident Statistics

by Harold Green, CFII

In a previous issue of Midwest Flyer Magazine, I made the suggestion that we might be well advised to encourage our students to think of how they might die when planning a flight, rather than just thinking about how they will succeed. About the same time, and totally independently, an article was published in AOPA Pilot listing 10 ways pilots die and decrying the fact that these 10 ways are known to all of us and we continue to make the same mistakes. In response to the AOPA article, a reader wrote in a letter to the editor, that this was a disservice to the aviation community. The rationale was that the public is treated to dramatic headlines every time there is an airplane accident no matter how slight, resulting in a negative attitude toward general aviation. The writer felt that we needed to assure the public that flying is safe and that an emphasis on accident causes would produce even more negative attitudes than now exist.

I respectfully disagree with the reader on two major counts: First, flying is not intrinsically safe…it is only as safe as we make it. Second, the best way to change the public’s view of general aviation is to reduce the accident rate. But, there is nothing we can do about the press sensationalizing any accident no matter how trivial.

First, consider intrinsic un-safety: Let’s face it; placing yourself in a machine several hundreds or thousands of feet above the earth is fraught with danger. The general public perhaps doesn’t understand all the nuances, but not being stupid, people do understand that. We know that flying, in practice, is safe despite the inherent dangers. What makes it safe is a combination of oversight of the design, maintenance, and manufacture of the airplanes we fly, coupled with the training and diligence of pilots. Unfortunately, statistics show that our machines are far safer than the folks who fly them.

The 10 Ways To Die article points out eloquently, that all 10 ways have been with us since we have been gathering accident statistics. The evidence for this can be found in the Nall Report published annually by the AOPA Air Safety Foundation. Looking over several years of the report, the disturbing thing is that the causes of aviation accidents remain the same not only in cause, but percentages as well.

For example, we can only wonder why someone tries to fly an airplane for five (5) hours with only four (4) hours of fuel onboard. Certainly it can’t be because they have not been told the consequences.

Behind those 10 ways people die must be a cause for their actions. While there are probably several causes, this discussion will consider only one of the possible causes – “complacency.” Other causes are reserved for later discussions.

Over 30 years ago, a Cessna Skylane ran out of fuel near our Middleton, Wisconsin location. The pilot skillfully landed in a newly mowed hayfield. So far, so good. He got a ride to our airport, bought 10 gallons of gas, got a ride back to the airplane, poured the gas into the plane and flew to the airport to top his tanks. When asked about his adventure, he said he had flown non-stop from Dallas, Texas and thought he was getting unusually low fuel consumption because his gauges still showed almost half tanks. Now at some point he had been taught how to calculate fuel consumption and range. Why did he do what he did?

While this pilot was lucky to run out of fuel near a hayfield and at the time of year when hay was being harvested, it was apparent that luck was all that saved him. Certainly planning and judgment played little or no role in his survival.

Fuel mismanagement is one of the more significant factors in our accident rate. Some fuel issues are related to mismanagement of the fuel system caused by incorrectly switching multiple tanks in aircraft so equipped. However, there are still a large number of accidents in single-engine, fixed-gear airplanes even with their very simple fuel systems. WHY? Is it poor training? Is it complacency?

Since the pilots presumably pass a knowledge test and, at some point, an instructor signs us off that we are competent, examined by a Designated Pilot Examiner and subject to a part 61.56 check ride (what we used to call a biennial flight review), we can assume that training, intelligence and competence are not factors. That leaves “complacency.”

Perhaps if we remind ourselves before every flight that flying is only as safe as we make it and acknowledge that we can die if we make a mistake, it will keep us alert.

I do not exclude myself from the possibility of complacency. At one point in my career, I owned a Cessna 310. This plane had two main tanks and two auxiliary tanks. It was common practice to burn off the fuel in the auxiliary tanks at the earliest possible time to keep the gust load capability of the plane at the maximum. We also ran the auxiliary tanks dry to make sure we knew that for possible future reference, there was no reserve there. When an engine started to lose power, it was simply a matter of throwing the appropriate fuel selector valve to “main” and hitting the boost pump. The engine didn’t even slow down in the process, but the loss of power was noticeable for the second or so until it was running again. Usually, time was allowed between switching to the left and right auxiliary tanks.

One night I decided that engines don’t burn fuel at the same rate, so I switched both to the auxiliary tank at the same time. I discovered that engines sometimes do burn fuel at the same rate. When both engines suddenly lost power, it became an EVENT!  Amazing how fast a pilot can react when properly sensitized…I didn’t lose a foot of altitude. Complacency!

As an instructor I see various levels of competence when a pilot wants a checkride to fly our airplanes at Morey Airplane Company. Most are quite acceptable; even though they may not fly the exact way I would like them to. However, sometimes the pilot has forgotten what the rudder pedals are for. We go screaming around onto final approach, usually at an airspeed too high with the ball off to the side. Usually this same pilot will hold no more than 30 degrees of bank because he/she has been told that banking too steeply onto final can result in a stall-spin. Then, when overshooting the path onto final, the rudder comes into play to get the nose pointing toward the runway and we go skidding around the turn with the ball even further off to one side and often with the airspeed dropping. Thrilling! But by golly, we have not exceeded 30 degrees of bank! Why?

My speculation is that there are two reasons: First, the pilot really did not understand what the whole issue was during training. Second, the pilot became complacent about his/her flying and simply doesn’t pay attention.

Some insight can be had by considering that when practicing steep turns with the same pilot, almost invariably the rudder is used properly. Perhaps the pilot had just not made the connection between a training maneuver intended to improve coordination and the actual application of that skill, or more likely has simply become complacent about flying patterns. Further, since steep turns are not practiced every day, the pilot perhaps has not become complacent and when asked to do them, the pilot knows that coordination, altitude and heading are important factors. Perhaps correcting this could be considered more an educational than a training exercise. However, corrected it should be to avoid one more data point in the accident statistics.

There are many other examples of what appears to be complacency in action:

Two extremely experienced pilots fly into a mountain despite the fact that they had terrain warning equipment on board. A Lockheed L1011 flies into a Florida swamp because the crew was discussing a possible light bulb failure. An airliner crashes because the crew was discussing personnel issues while their airplane collected an insupportable load of ice.

The message is, don’t ever become complacent about flying. It is NOT inherently safe. Flying is safe, and we know it is, but it is only because we pilots make it so and we can make it safer.

This entry was posted in April/May 2013, Columns, Columns, Pilot Proficiency and tagged , , , . Bookmark the permalink.

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