On January 29, 2025, a U.S. Army Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter collided mid-air with American Airlines Flight 5342, a Bombardier CRJ700 aircraft operated by PSA Airlines, over the Potomac River, about one-half mile short of Runway 33 at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) in Arlington, Virginia. It is a very unfortunate accident that has affected the lives of many. May the souls involved rest in peace. I also want to express my deepest condolences to their families and friends. But the accident has also shaken up many in the industry, especially controllers, and pilots who often fly in, out and around the D.C. area.
I still believe (and the statistics prove it so) that aviation is the safest transportation mode in the U.S. I also firmly believe in letting the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) do their professional job to tell us what exactly went wrong and how we might modify existing rules, procedures, equipage, training, etc. to prevent such an accident from happening again. However, as both a dual-rated pilot, there are some things I want to bring up as food for thought, especially since some of these things have been bothering me for years. Some are related to the D.C. accident and some are not, but I would love the aviation community to consider them to prevent future accidents. I know that, historically, most changes have been “written in blood” (they come as a result of incidents and accidents), but it doesn’t have to be that way. When something doesn’t make sense, it should be studied and corrected ahead of time.
According to the FAA’s Airplane Flying Handbook (Chapter 2, Aeronautical Decision-Making), (https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/airplane_handbook/00_afh_full.pdf) Situational (or Situation) Awareness (SA) is “the accurate perception and understanding of ALL the factors and conditions within the five fundamental risk elements (flight, pilot, aircraft, environment, and type of operation that comprise any given aviation situation) that affect safety before, during, and after the flight. Monitoring radio communications for traffic, weather discussion, and ATC communication can enhance situational awareness by helping the pilot develop a mental picture of what is happening.” The paragraph goes further to state that pilots should understand why they are given certain instructions by ATC (in addition to what those instructions are). Generally, SA is about “having the big picture to stay ahead of the aircraft.” More specifically, SA is about perceiving (noticing, scanning, gathering data), understanding/interpreting, and anticipating so that one can formulate an effective plan (make a decision) and act accordingly. I wholeheartedly agree, and there is research1 that states that many aviation accidents that occur as a result of human error have been attributed to low situational awareness. As such, when in an airport environment that requires two-way communication between pilots and ATC, I firmly believe ALL pilots must be able to hear and understand ALL communications (from controllers and from fellow pilots). Unfortunately, there are a few scenarios I want to bring up as problematic:
- There are times when military aircraft are transmitting on Ultra High Frequency (UHF), while civilian aircraft always transmit on Very High Frequency (VHF). The two frequency types are not compatible, meaning civilian aircraft cannot hear military aircraft and military aircraft cannot hear civilian aircraft. This is a miss. While all pilots can hear ATC transmissions (because controllers are transmitting on both at the same time), they can’t hear all pilot transmissions (only those in the same frequency). Therefore, they are only getting “half the story.” It fails the situational awareness concept. I am using the Albuquerque Sectional as an example, showing VHF and UHF frequencies for the same FAA ATC facilities.
- Similarly, some busy airports have two tower frequencies: the “regular” frequency and a helicopter frequency. So, again, all pilots should be able to hear ATC transmissions (the controller is transmitting on both at the same time), but airplane pilots can’t hear helicopter pilots, and helicopter pilots can’t hear airplane pilots. Once again, pilots are only getting “half the story” and this fails SA. I’m using DCA as the example because of the recent accident, but many others have this situation as well.
- Furthermore, some airports have multiple tower frequencies. While it may make sense at times (for example, Chicago O’Hare Int’l (KORD) since it operates like more than one airport), I do not believe the practice provides proper SA most of the time. I’ll use John Wayne/Orange County Airport (KSNA) as an example of an airport where I would question it since the parallel runways are very close to each other, there are three hot spots on taxiways next to the runways, there is limited space to hold between the two runways, and we’ve had pilots land on the wrong surface before. Again, full situational awareness cannot be achieved if all pilots aren’t hearing all transmissions.
- ICAO recognizes six (6) languages for aviation usage: English, Spanish, French, Russian, Arabic, and Chinese/Mandarin, but all pilots and controllers have to demonstrate a certain level of English proficiency to obtain their accreditation. I have an issue with certain countries (Peru and Spain as examples I’m familiar with) allowing aviation communications in their own native language in addition to English. The moment there is a pilot on the radio that does not speak or understand the native language, there is a breach of communication and situational awareness. English should be the only language allowed on the radio when non-native speakers are on it.
Beginning in 2020, the FAA mandated that aircraft operating in most controlled airspace be equipped with Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out. However, legislation prohibited the installation of ADS-B equipment on certain Department of Defense (DoD) aircraft and the FAA allowed the military and other sensitive operations (conducted by federal, state and local government entities in matters of national defense, homeland security, intelligence and law enforcement) to fly with their installed ADS-B Out off. Notice I stated the FAA allowed the military to fly with their installed ADS-B off; that was purposeful. Most military aircraft are now equipped with ADS-B Out, but they choose to fly with the equipment off. While I can understand and support ADS-B Out data not getting published on public platforms (such as FlightAware or FlightRadar 24, especially in real time), it is important that ALL aircraft appear on ADS-B In and other traffic information displays/equipment. Again, pilots don’t have “the full, big picture” otherwise. This should not signify a big impact for many governmental agencies since many of the aircraft are already equipped… the equipment is just not being turned on.
Airports with “heavy” helicopter operations normally have Letters of Agreement (LOAs) in place that describe how helicopters should operate in the airport environment: routes of flight (including naming of certain waypoints to use), altitudes, frequencies, expected communications, etc. Oftentimes these LOAs are between the local FAA tower and the helicopter operator(s), and it is my understanding that they are not always published publicly. So, while they may be helpful to based helicopter operators, transient helicopter traffic and non-helicopter traffic are not “in the know.” When the information is publicly available, it is usually published as a Letter to Airmen (LTA) and, as far as I know, they can only be found on ForeFlight or on the NOTAM search website (www.notams.aim.faa.gov).
It has been my experience that most pilots are not familiar with LTAs. LTAs are informational in nature. Checking of said website does not constitute a normal pre-flight item for pilots, and the FAA does not have a way of knowing a pilot checked it, so it does not constitute an official pre-flight briefing). So, how good are they if the entire pilot community is not aware of them or doesn’t have access to them?
When talking about traffic patterns, the FAA’s Helicopter Flying Handbook (HFH) (https://www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/regulations_policies/handbooks_manuals/aviation/helicopter_flying_handbook/helicopter_flying_handbook.pdf) says that “due to specialized operating characteristics, airplanes and helicopters do not mix well in the same traffic environment. At multiple-use airports, regulation states that helicopters should always avoid the flow of fixed-wing traffic.” The AIM makes it seem like the reason for separating helicopters and airplanes is “to minimize overall delays; however, there will be situations where faster/larger helicopters may be integrated with fixed-wing aircraft for the benefit of all concerned.” Honestly, while I understand the delay/capacity reason (I do work as an aviation planner, after all), that should not be the only reason. Safety should be a reason as well. I believe the HFH explains it better. Separating airplane and helicopter traffic is a good general practice even for helicopters transiting through airport airspace (but not necessarily landing). If that’s not possible, they should be deconflicted by both vertical and horizontal separation (keeping possible wake/rotor turbulence in mind as well). I have a feeling this will be a key point in the NTSB investigation. The Baltimore-Washington Helicopter Route Chart (https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/digital_products/vfr/) clearly shows a possible mingling of airplane and helicopter traffic in and around DCA.
Don’t let me stop you from flying often, but please do fly safe! Make sure all your senses are active and always, always be ahead of the aircraft!
References:
- “Rodgers and Nye reported that a high percentage of operational errors can be directly attributed to SA problems. Some 36% of the operational errors investigated involved communications errors, with 20% specifically involving read-back problems. Furthermore, communications problems and read-back errors, specifically those involving altitude information, were significantly more likely to be involved in operational errors of a greater severity.” (DOT/FAA/AM-94/27 Situation Awareness Information Requirements for En Route Air Traffic Control, December 1994)
